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Shop Window Policy versus Informal Talks? Diverging Strategies in German Foreign Policy

10/13/2008

There have been reports, recently that Germany’s external relations are becoming blurred. The chancellor, Ms. Merkel, it seems, puts some emphasis on symbolic politics and has a focus on human rights observance – more than her predecessor, Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder. The current foreign minister, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, sometimes indicates that he is not particularly happy with a strong shift towards ethics in IR. Some observers assume that this divergence may be exacerbated when it is officially announced that these two people, Merkel and Steinmeier, will be the leading figures for their parties in the upcoming (2009) federal elections in Germany. Merkel is chairwoman of her Christian Democratic Party (CDU) and will certainly be top of her party’s list. Steinmeier, deputy chairman of the Social Democratic Party, will probably step in as the point man for the SPD because the acting chairman, Kurt Beck, is faring badly in the opinion polls. 

However, are these forecasts regarding an increasingly contradictory German foreign policy plausible, besides two leading politicians running for office and producing election time statements? There are doubts, and I think those doubts are legitimate. Over the last 60 years, Germany’s external behaviour has been remarkably steady. No matter which party has been leading the government, the general trajectory of Germany’s foreign policy and international relations has been relatively clear and   can be defined by four factors.

Firstly, Germany always had a limited sovereignty. Immediately after World War 2 and up to the unification process, there were formal limits to Germany’s sovereignty, guaranteed by the four victorious powers (US, USSR, UK and France). During this period, there was a second trend – the EU was established and gradually emerged as a major entity. Germany was firmly embedded into this organization. This, too, required the transfer of sovereignty toward this supranational body. Finally, since the 1980s, globalization has been accelerating and also eroding traditional concepts of the nation state and of national sovereignty. Traditional hard power has more and more been transformed into soft power. This is what Germany had to learn after 1945. So, on balance, Germany acquired the capability to act in a configuration of limited sovereignty, and it did so quite successfully.

Secondly, Germany was a prime example of what some scholars later labelled „civilian power“ (Zivilmacht). Germany, along with Japan, had to learn how to develop politically without being able to develop a strong military component again. So the prime focus of the post-war development was on the economy, social relations, governance forms and culture. Seemingly, this worked out quite well. Today, Germany also has some military components and has deployed some 9.000 troops worldwide in peace keeping missions. Nevertheless, it would appear that no one is scared about a potential German assertiveness anymore. This is because Germany has developed a credible status as a predominantly civilian power.

Thirdly, Germany is a trading state (Handelsstaat). Germany is highly dependent on imports (primarily energy and raw materials) and, also, on the export of machinery. It is not by accident that Germany has held the informal title of ‘world’s export champion’ for quite some time. However, this model of economic and social development, resting on a very successful trade policy and on working global trade patterns, depends on peace and stability. Without these qualities, trade is not possible or is at least, risky. So, no matter who governs in (formerly) Bonn and (now) Berlin, Germany will always advocate a stable international environment.

Finally, there are domestic factors defining Germany’s external attitudes. Germany is a federal state, and the German Laender (national states) are quite influential – both in terms of their constitutional rights and their actual behaviour. All of them have representations – quasi-embassies – at the EU in Brussels, and some also have representatives in other countries and regions. The second chamber, the Bundesrat, is influential in confirming (or rejecting) international treaties. Numbers are also part of this political framework of domestic fabric, allowing for a system of checks and balances in German politics that also covers external relations. All those four factors are firmly in place today. So, whatever the electoral and the media waves will produce in terms of nervous irritations the general line of Germany’s external politics will remain stable.